
There is a high degree of uncertainty over the approach a second Trump administration will take. However, indications so far are that the US government will place even greater emphasis on maintaining US leadership in strategic technologies. This would potentially involve increased government opposition to regulation of the most advanced US tech companies at home and abroad. Looking at three key areas:
Much of this remains uncertain. The Republican Party - including Trump, Carr, and Vice President-elect JD Vance - are hostile towards what they perceive as Big Tech political bias, and leading Republicans have previously expressed support for breaking up the largest companies. Nevertheless, there is a distinct possibility that the US administration will come to see digital regulation around the world as a trade issue and more actively intervene to support US companies.
As Flint’s AI-Pac blog series has shown, most governments across the APAC region have expressed scepticism about broad, EU-style AI regulation. Nevertheless, concerns over issues such as AI-enabled scams, election-related deepfakes, and the use of deepfakes to harass women have led several governments across the region to consider bringing in laws aimed at regulating AI development. Concerns over dependence on foreign AI developers has also driven a focus on developing domestic AI capabilities.
If, under Trump, the US government is more vocally championing the benefits of a deregulatory, free-market approach to AI, it may give APAC governments pause for thought before implementing sweeping AI regulation. There may be a greater appetite to instead consider targeted, sector-specific rules as opposed to economy-wide frameworks, as well as co-regulatory approaches based on cooperation with industry. Singapore has stood out in the region as a leading advocate for a more targeted, cooperative approach.
One question, however, concerns the extent to which multilateral cooperation on AI safety will endure under a Trump administration. Singapore, Korea, and Japan have all established their own AI safety institutes and have discussed deepening cooperation on AI safety testing with the UK and other like-minded countries. This cooperation is likely to continue even if the US were to disengage from multilateral cooperation. However, this would inevitably affect the momentum and ambition of such cooperation. A potential result is deeper fragmentation of regulatory standards and a push by China to exercise greater influence over AI policy and regulation around the world. We have previously written about China’s global AI ambitions here.
A number of governments in the region are implementing or considering ex-ante regulations for digital markets at least in part modelled on the EU’s Digital Markets Act (DMA). These regulations, which usually target a small number of designated ‘gatekeeper’ companies, attract a particular risk of negative US attention as the companies in scope tend to be largely US firms.
Concerns about concentration in digital markets are widely held across the region, with Japan, Australia, India and Korea having previously set out their ambitions to tighten regulation. Further regulation remains likely even under a Trump presidency, but governments may moderate their approach to place greater emphasis on transparency requirements and on regulatory dialogue and appeal mechanisms in order to placate the US. Another possibility is that governments actually widen the scope of ex-ante regulation to capture more domestic firms so that not only US firms are targeted - India has taken this step as it progresses consultations on its planned Digital Competition Bill. Beyond these four countries, other countries previously considering ex-ante rules - Thailand, for example - may be more likely to delay and defer. Governments’ concern to avoid US tariffs may influence their considerations here.
However, in the medium to long term, if a Trump presidency fuels economic nationalism and protectionism around the world, it will only intensify the pursuit of technological sovereignty. Several APAC governments - led by Korea and India - are more likely to perceive the need to reduce their dependence on foreign companies for key technologies. The long-term impact could be an intensification of policies aimed at promoting domestic champions to the detriment of foreign competitors.
Across the region, concerns over disinformation, child safety, and scams have driven a wave of regulation aimed at securing the online space. Yet here too, a Trump presidency and the President’s proximity to Elon Musk creates uncertainty. Musk has repeatedly pushed back against the EU’s DSA by citing freedom of speech and JD Vance has linked the EU’s regulation of X to the question of the US’s continuing membership of NATO.
APAC governments - to varying degrees - are less likely to de-emphasise platform regulation in response to anticipated US pressure. In several countries, public concerns over harmful content online means that there is a political dividend to being seen to stand up to ‘Big Tech’ on these issues. This political calculus is evident in Australia’s bipartisan rush towards a social media ban for under-16s and in Malaysia’s willingness to challenge tech companies over their opposition to its licensing plan for social media. There will be continuing momentum to regulate the online space.
Despite this, a Trump presidency will still impact governments’ approach to regulating these issues. Policymakers may tread more cautiously in how they frame regulation in order to avoid the perception that it is at all targeted at political speech or at speech related to culturally sensitive issues in the US. They may instead be likely to frame their proposals as targeting strictly defined issues of national security, child safety, and economic crime. Businesses may also, in some cases, find increased appetite from governments to engage with arguments on guardrails for free speech in such regulation.
The high degree of uncertainty makes it difficult to put definite planning in place. Businesses have to develop planning around a range of geopolitical and regulatory scenarios. However, for now, there are three broad points for business to consider in how they respond:
This blog was written by Ewan Lusty, David Skelton and Matthew Lehrfeld. Ewan and David are both based in Singapore. Ewan has been supporting Flint clients on a range of digital policy issues for over four years, prior to which he advised UK government ministers on online safety regulation. David spent seven years at Google, most recently working within the Global Strategy and Innovation team, as well as leading Google’s Policy Planning team within Asia Pacific. Matthew, formerly a US diplomat, supports clients on policy, political and regulatory issues that intersect with US domestic and foreign policy.