Flint advises international businesses and investors on policy, politics, regulation and competition.
Flint advises international businesses and investors on policy, politics, regulation and competition.
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Supply chain disruptions – from the pandemic to ongoing trade frictions – have pushed businesses to rethink how they source, produce, and reach customers. The same period saw an accelerated shift online, placing additional spotlight on digital ecosystems and the rules that govern them.
In response, Asia-Pacific (APAC) authorities have stepped up competition enforcement, targeting both traditional and digital markets while investing in stronger legal and analytical capacity Concurrently, geopolitical tensions have added a further layer of scrutiny as governments look inward with more protectionist policies.
In this blog:
APAC competition policy is currently developing against a backdrop of rising protectionism and great-power rivalry. Competition regulators find themselves navigating the increasing influence of non-competition factors – merger reviews and investigations may be impacted by concerns over foreign influence and strategic control or used as a tool to retaliate against unfavourable foreign government policies [1]. Businesses and investors must appreciate that competition policy in APAC is often an instrument in a larger policy toolkit. Navigating this landscape requires being both technically rigorous and politically informed.
Increased scrutiny of foreign businesses and transactions
One of the most visible intersections of geopolitics and antitrust is the increasing scrutiny of foreign businesses. Nowhere is this more evident than in China, where the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) has ramped up antitrust investigations into US firms and deals involving foreign buyers. In early 2025, SAMR opened a formal antitrust probe into Google – a striking move given Google’s core services do not operate in China. The timing was explicitly retaliatory: Beijing announced the Google investigation minutes after the tariffs came into effect. China has employed a similar playbook to other US companies. In late 2024, SAMR launched an investigation into Nvidia soon after Washington tightened export controls on semiconductors. Chinese authorities can therefore use retaliatory antitrust measures to apply pressure on the US while officially framing them as legitimate efforts to ensure fair competition.
Foreign investment reviews have also become more stringent to ensure transactions do not undermine national security or cede control of critical assets to foreign rivals. A recent example is SAMR’s intervention in a ports deal between Hong Kong’s CK Hutchison and a US-backed consortium, which was delayed because of a review initiated by SAMR over concerns over fair market competition and ‘public interest’. Similarly, Australia is shifting towards a mandatory pre-merger notification system, which, while separate from the foreign investment review process, could result in foreign acquisitions in strategic sectors (ports, defence, critical minerals) being blocked even if the ACCC finds no substantial lessening of competition.
Domestic champions take priority
APAC regulators are also demonstrating flexibility when it comes to reviewing joint ventures, cooperation/collaboration-type agreements, and mergers in strategic industries that advance national interests. In some cases, competition authorities have cleared anti-competitive consolidations to create “national champions”. In South Korea, the merger of Korean Air and Asiana in 2024 is a clear example of the government’s intention to create a national champion – despite the consolidation effectively creating a monopoly in the domestic full-service airline market. Indeed, the South Korean government actively promoted this merger from the outset as a rescue of Asiana and a path to a stronger flag carrier, and because of the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC)’s institutional design and dependence on presidential appointments, it lacked sufficient autonomy to oppose government-backed decisions. The merger of Air India with Vistara in India, likewise, gained swift approval from the Competition Commission (and the government) as it strengthens the national carrier.
As such, local incumbents may receive home-country advantages in antitrust matters, especially if identified as national champions or essential to economic strategy. Building domestic champions can also involve discouraging or blocking foreign bids that might threaten their position, but the lines between a justified public interest test and a more protectionist stance can be blurred – making it important to engage with key local decision-makers to understand the underlying rationale for regulatory actions.
One should also note that the enforcement of competition policy can vary by sector: sectors such as airlines, energy, telecoms, and technology are often viewed through a strategic lens. Enforcement decisions in these sectors may be less predictable (e.g. longer regulatory approval timelines) and subject to government intervention or behind-the-scenes negotiations.
Digital competition regimes face geopolitical headwinds
The rise of digital economy regulations is a global phenomenon, and APAC is no exception. Persuaded in part by the EU’s Digital Markets Act (DMA), several Asia-Pacific countries – including India, Australia, South Korea, and Thailand – are considering ex-ante rules to address perceived concerns in digital markets. However, broad-based regulations modelled upon the DMA could risk escalating trade tensions with the US, as the companies likely to fall within scope are predominantly US firms [2].
Trump’s recent announcement on reciprocal tariffs addressing “non-tariff barriers” – including digital trade barriers – clearly signals that foreign regulation affecting US tech firms could provoke retaliation. This is consistent with previous warnings from his administration about “discriminatory taxes” on US companies. Earlier this year, US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer warned South Korea that advancing rules that unfairly burden US tech firms “won't be tolerated", prompting the KFTC Chairman to pledge to avoid trade friction with Washington. This reflects earlier tensions in late 2023, when Trump’s former National Security Advisor described South Korea’s proposed platform regulation as “a gift to the Chinese Communist Party”. The KFTC later withdrew the proposal, amid mounting geopolitical scrutiny.
There are parallels with the situation in Japan, where a narrow ex-ante law targeting mobile app stores and operating systems – mainly affecting Apple and Google – has drawn sharp criticism from industry groups. They argue that the law disproportionately burdens US tech giants while exempting major Japanese and Chinese players. The US administration has shown interest in these developments as part of its broader investigation into trade deficits and alleged unfair practices, and the law may feature in ongoing negotiations.
Governments will tread carefully to avoid triggering a negative US response to stricter policies targeting digital gatekeepers. In markets such as Australia, where public support for regulating Big Tech is strong, there may be political risks in appearing to yield too much to US pressure. But in others – such as Thailand and India – regulators may delay and defer action to avoid US scrutiny. India’s Minister of State for Corporate Affairs recently remarked that the government was “not in a big rush” to enact the digital competition bill.
Overall, the tension between domestic regulatory ambitions and external geopolitical pressures is affecting the trajectory of digital competition policy in the region. These dynamics create space for businesses to advocate for alternatives to sweeping, EU-style regulation and to challenge its suitability in the APAC context. However, US businesses in particular will be mindful of the potential risks for their reputation and relationships in some APAC markets of being seen to be too close to the US administration. A more assertive US approach to trade and technology will also encourage APAC governments to seek to strengthen intra-regional trade and to accelerate initiatives to develop digital sovereignty to reduce their dependence on US tech.
Despite the rising influence of politics, traditional antitrust analysis and market economics remain important. Geopolitics may shift priorities or add layers of review, but it has generally not supplanted the core mission of ensuring fair competition. Enforcement against cartels and anti-competitive agreements remains robust and relatively insulated from politics. Total fines on cartel activity across key Asian markets grew by more than 5 times from 2020 to 2023. Merger control regimes have also been strengthening throughout APAC. China’s horizontal merger review guidelines came into effect in December 2024, detailing use of quantitative tools and setting safe harbour thresholds. Similarly, Australia’s mandatory, suspensory merger regime will begin in 2026. In South East Asia, Malaysia is looking to introduce merger control to its existing generic competition law framework by the third-quarter of 2025.
In practice, we see a hybrid approach: regulators accommodate political directives to an extent, but do require solid economic justifications. Where political factors are present, agencies often still seek a competition-based rationale to support the decision. For example, South Korea’s KFTC, in supporting the government on the Korean Air/Asiana merger, still produced analyses acknowledging anti-competitive effects and imposed remedies (albeit limited) to mitigate them.
Ultimately, agencies need to reconcile political directives with the analytical framework of competition law as ignoring the latter would significantly damage the credibility and even attractiveness of the country for foreign businesses.
Competition policy in the region is complex, nuanced and fragmented – this blog focuses on the geopolitical angle, which is part of a broader story that includes other themes such as and development and deployment of AI services.
Competition policy does not operate in a vacuum. Investors and businesses operating in the region need to combine careful economic analysis with strategic political engagement, understanding the narratives that could influence enforcement across jurisdictions. Companies that approach regulators and governments with the right messages may shape the regulatory trajectory in a way that aligns with both public and private interests.
Flint Global advises clients on competition matters across APAC by combining our competition expertise with a deep senior adviser network at local government and regulatory levels in key markets.
This blog was written by Webster Zhou, , Hari Pillay and Ethan Teo. Webster is a Manager based in Hong Kong with experience in post-cartel damages and merger enforcement cases. Hari is a Senior Adviser advising clients on all matters involving competition and antitrust policy (focus on South East Asia). He was previously the Director of the Enforcement Division and Board Secretary at the Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore (CCCS). Ethan previously worked at Singapore’s Smart Nation Group under the Prime Minister’s Office and interned with the public affairs and trust & safety teams of Grab, Twitter, and Carousell.
[1] It is important to distinguish two distinct motivations that can shape regulatory action:
[2] Note that Chinese platforms such as ByteDance and Alibaba already enjoy significant market power in some APAC markets, so they too could be captured under new digital regulations. For example in Malaysia, TikTok has 28.68mn users compared to Facebook’s 22.35mn.