The recent rupture between Washington and Madrid has sharpened a question that has been quietly gaining urgency in Brussels: what comes next for European Union defence policy? After Spain refused to authorise the use of its bases for U.S. operations linked to escalating tensions with Iran, President Donald Trump’s threat to cut off trade with a NATO ally exposed the continuing fragility of transatlantic political cohesion.
This uncertainty is accelerating a debate that continues to gather momentum across the EU: whether Europe’s defence industrial base, procurement frameworks and financing instruments remain fit for an era in which U.S. support cannot be assumed to be unconditional or predictable. The question is no longer whether the EU should strengthen its defence capacity, but how far it should go in reshaping procurement rules, defining “European preference,” and recalibrating relations with partners such as the United Kingdom and the United States.
The 62nd Munich Security Conference, held from 13 to 15 February 2026, provided an early glimpse of this new strategic phase. Discussions in Munich revealed a growing convergence around the need for greater industrial resilience and coordinated capability development — but also deep divisions over how autonomous Europe should become, and who should be included in its defence market.
Testing the Alliance: What Munich Revealed
The 62nd Munich Security Conference highlighted how transatlantic uncertainties are increasingly shaping Europe’s defence procurement decisions. While Secretary of State Marco Rubio maintained a cautious tone, the core elements of the Trump administration’s policies confirmed European concerns about long-term reliance on US security guarantees and supply chain disruptions. Although US officials reaffirmed their support for NATO, unpredictability over Article 5 and Greenland is pushing the EU to further consider strategic autonomy and European preferences in procurement.
Representatives from the defence industry expressed frustration over fragmented demand within the EU, regulatory uncertainties, and heavy dependence on US capabilities. They advocated for more coordinated and long-term European procurement strategies.
Operational efforts, such as the EU Drone Shield or the Eastern Flank Strategy, and investments in integrated air defence and counter-UAS systems, show a shift towards joint capability development. However, this sits at odds with a collapsing FCAS agreement between France and Germany – whether the dispute is technical or political in nature.
A UK-EU Defence Reset?
British Prime Minister Keir Starmer used his platform at the Munich Security Conference to signal a clear intention to deepen EU-UK defence cooperation, including potential UK participation in the defence component of the EU’s €90 billion Ukraine loan and, in time, eligibility for a possible second round of the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) fund. The move reflects a broader British effort to secure structured access to emerging EU defence instruments despite its status outside the Union. While Brussels appears politically receptive to closer cooperation, a message reiterated by European Parliament President Roberta Metsola in her recent remarks at Chatham House, the decisive question lies with the Member States. As the EU sharpens debates around “European preference” and the protection of its defence industrial base, governments will need to determine whether, and under what conditions, UK defence firms should benefit from EU-funded procurement. The issue is therefore less about post-Brexit rapprochement and more about the boundaries of Europe’s emerging defence market and who ultimately controls access to it.
IAA and European Preference: A regulatory speedbump for UK-EU defence cooperation.
The current high-profile issue engaging UK and EU officials, and on which they are struggling to reach a compromise, is the Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA). Originally scheduled for publication in January, the proposal was postponed three times and was finally published on 4 March, providing a clearer view of how the Commission intends to define “Made in Europe” criteria. Under the legislative proposal, a product is considered made in the EU if its content is produced either within the EU or in a third country with which the EU has a free trade area or customs union. This definition would cover a broad set of countries, including EEA/EFTA states, the UK, Canada, Japan, and South Korea. However, the status of the US remains unclear, given its inconsistent adherence to the Agreement on Government Procurement and the absence of a legally binding agreement with the EU.
The difficulty in delivering the IAA in a timely manner highlights divisions among Member States, with distinct patterns emerging that reflect differing visions of how European competitiveness should be strengthened. The issue therefore extends to a broad range of sectors and affects a wide range of policy areas, with defence at the forefront of the debate. Several related initiatives are currently underway, including the revision of the Defence Procurement Directive, originally adopted in 2009. The revision aims to address production bottlenecks, lengthy procedures, and incentives for joint procurement, and is also examining the introduction of a “European preference mechanism” in order to boost the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB).
The Commission launched a public consultation from November 2025 to February 2026 to gather feedback from a broad range of stakeholders. Industry actors (37%) and public authorities (28%) accounted for the majority of responses, reflecting significant interest and concern regarding public procurement rules and the conditions governing participation. The submissions reveal apprehension among non-EU stakeholders, who fear that such initiatives could restrict market access and limit opportunities to benefit from public funding.
While expressing support for the initiative and the objective of strengthening the EDTIB, the Norwegian Defence and Security Industries Association (FSI) stressed that any such measures should not undermine “established transatlantic relations and bilateral relations between Member States and non-EU European nations,” and emphasised that any regulation introducing a “European preference” must comply with existing bilateral commitments. Similarly, the US Department of Defense opposed any EU initiative that would restrict American arms manufacturers’ access to the European market, warning that this could provoke reciprocal measures. European stakeholders, however, such as the Conseil des Industries de Défense Française CIDEF (France), argued that “the lack of a clear and enforceable European preference maintains the EU’s dependence on external design authorities and intellectual property,” and called for operational guidelines to support Member States wishing to implement European preference in procurement procedures.
The Commission is expected to publish its proposal in the third quarter of 2026, after which interinstitutional negotiations with the Council and the Parliament will commence. The approach taken by the IAA provides insight into how the Commission intends to define “European preference” in the context of public procurement. However, as defence remains a highly specific policy domain in which national governments retain primary authority, further debate on the issue can be expected. Member States such as France are likely to uphold clear red lines and, while they may demonstrate flexibility regarding the inclusion of non-EU countries in public procurement in other sectors, they will remain firmly anchored to their positions when core national security interests are at stake.
A New Presidency: How the Irish Pillars affect defence posture
Against the backdrop of transatlantic uncertainty, renewed debates on “European preference”, and growing pressure to consolidate the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base, the Irish Presidency of the Council of the EU in the second half of 2026 will assume office at a particularly sensitive juncture.
Ireland plans to structure its Presidency around three overarching pillars - Competitiveness, Security, and Values - which together provide a clear framework for its approach to defence and procurement policy. Ireland sees EU support for Ukraine as steadfast and cross-cutting, while acknowledging that the trajectory of the war remains uncertain. In this context, the Presidency is expected to prioritise continuity in financial and military support frameworks, alongside implementation of key defence-related initiatives. In parallel, Ireland supports the use of rule-of-law conditionalities in EU funding and continues to advocate strongly for enlargement, particularly for Ukraine, albeit on a merit-based and potentially phased basis. Security, financial governance and values are therefore conceived as interlinked dimensions of the same strategic framework.
A new EU Security Strategy should be coming before the summer, and Ireland plans to focus on advancing the military mobility package and broader space and defence commitments under the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). The emphasis is likely to be on operational delivery and budgetary architecture rather than institutional redesign.
European Unity is no certain thing
The trajectory of EU defence policy remains fluid. The most recent transatlantic rupture, between Washington and Madrid this time, may yet prove to be a catalytic moment, accelerating efforts to consolidate Europe’s industrial base and formalise “European preference” in procurement. If transatlantic volatility persists, political momentum for a more autonomous and financially integrated European defence framework could strengthen considerably.
Yet European integration in defence is far from inevitable. The ongoing collapse of the Franco-German Future Combat Air System (FCAS) programme serves as a reminder that national industrial interests, strategic cultures and sovereignty concerns retain the capacity to stall collective ambition. The same Member States debating autonomy in Brussels continue to guard core defence prerogatives at home.
What comes next for EU and wider European defence policy will therefore depend on two parallel forces: the degree of external pressure generated by transatlantic instability, and the willingness of Member States to subordinate national priorities to shared industrial and strategic goals. The direction of travel may be toward deeper integration, but the outcome remains contingent, shaped as much by intra-European politics as by events beyond Europe’s borders.
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