What the US intervention in Venezuela reveals about Trump’s foreign policy 

On 3 January, US forces carried out airstrikes and a military operation in Venezuela’s capital, Caracas, capturing President Nicolás Maduro who has been in power since 2013. Venezuela’s Vice President Delcy Rodríguez has assumed presidential powers as interim President.  

This US action in Venezuela illustrates Trump’s increased focus on the US sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere, as set out in the National Security Strategy published at the end of 2025. The intervention is also motivated by Trump’s desire to strengthen US access to natural resources and aligns with his domestic agenda on drugs and immigration. The US has been hostile to Maduro for many years. 

The intervention confirms Trump’s readiness to mount short and sharp military actions as already seen in Iran and Nigeria in 2025. But in this case, the US now has the ongoing problem of managing a political transition in difficult circumstances. They have decapitated the regime but not fully changed it, leaving Delcy Rodríguez as interim President. No Venezuelan government can afford to be seen as a total US puppet. Controlling the whole country from afar will be a challenge if different factions, including armed groups in southern Venezuela, compete for power and influence. 

What comes next remains unclear. Trump suggested that US oil companies would provide investment and help rebuild the country’s broken infrastructure. This would take time. Further military intervention could be on the cards if the interim government does not abide by Trump’s directives. 

Maduro’s collapse is a blow to Russia’s influence. Putin has lost a key ally in South America, and Trump’s decisiveness is likely to incentivise him to protect his remaining regional allies, notably in Cuba. For China, the implications are tactically challenging, but potentially strategically empowering. The intervention demonstrates US assertiveness but also implies acceptance of great power spheres of influence. US action may not make a Chinese military annexation of Taiwan more likely, but it will reinforce Chinese entitlement to influence and control in their immediate environs. China currently buys about 60-80% of Venezuela’s oil exports, approximately 5% of its imports. Combined with current concerns over the stability of Iranian supply, China’s stake in Venezuelan oil is meaningful to them and disruption would create tension ahead of Trump’s meeting with Xi in April. China is unlikely to give up on their investment and influence in Venezuela or the wider region easily.

Oil supplies from Venezuela are likely to be disrupted in the short term. However, Venezuelan oil exports were already subject to extensive sanctions and accounted for less than 1% of global oil output, so near-term upward pressure on prices is likely to be limited. Over the medium term, this effect could be outweighed by the potential for additional Venezuelan supply to return to global markets, supported by US involvement and investment.

In terms of US domestic politics, the operation may lead to further discontent among the MAGA wing opposed to foreign military interventions. That said, there has been notable support for the removal of Maduro from congressional leaders and leading Republicans and Democrats on the intelligence committees. Rubio was the driving force behind this operation, which could influence his political fortunes as he and Vance compete to be Trump's heir. 

Initial European responses were ambiguous on the legality of the operation, which is being tested both in the US courts and in the UN Security Council. Responses did not seem to be well coordinated and avoided antagonising Trump at a key moment in the Ukraine talks. But for Europeans, this US action points to another unwelcome step towards a “might is right” world.  

The US action in Venezuela raises the question of other possible US interventions in the region. Trump has made non-specific threats to Colombia, Cuba and Mexico. He has also reiterated his objective of taking control of Greenland, if necessary, using force. Several European countries including France, Germany, Italy have publicly declared support for Denmark, but European and NATO unity will be tested on this issue. Even if Trump refrains from military action, political pressure will increase, and some form of control over the territory and it resources remains a strategic objective of his administration.

US assertiveness in the Western Hemisphere has material implications for international business operating there, not only in mining and resource extraction. More widely, the Trump administration’s readiness to use coercive methods and a weakening commitment to rules-based norms risk accelerating political and economic divergence between the US and its traditional allies, notably the EU. Overall, tensions in the Western Hemisphere, and the potential Chinese response, are likely to result in more volatile regulatory environments, trade fragmentation, and increased pressure on companies and investors to align with potentially conflicting US and EU strategic priorities, notably in energy, defence, infrastructure and technology.

This blog was written by Francois-Joseph Schichan, Partner, Simon Fraser, Founding Partner, and Beth Sizeland, Partner. Francois-Joseph is a former French diplomat and co-leads Flint’s geopolitics practice. Simon is Flint’s Founding Partner and former head of the UK foreign service. He is the Chair of Chatham House. Before joining Flint, Beth worked as the Joint Intelligence Organisation attaché in Washington DC. She was also a former UK Deputy National Security Adviser.

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